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Targeted killings
Legal and ethical justifications
Tomasz Żuradzki1
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is the analysis of both legal and ethical ways 
of justifying targeted killings. I compare two legal models: the law enforcement 
model vs the rules of armed conflicts; and two ethical ones: retribution vs the 
right of self-defence. I argue that, if the targeted killing is to be either legally or 
ethically justified, it would be so due to fulfilling of some criteria common for 
all acceptable forms of killing, and not because terrorist activity is somehow 
distinguished and gives special privileges to a state that fights it. The practical 
implication of my analysis is that one of the most spectacular targeted killings, 
which was the targeting and killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, was not 
justified, because it was only supposed to be a retribution for the September 11th 
terrorist attacks.
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1. Introduction
In the recent years one can observe practices that are morally 
controversial and often incompatible with international law.  The advo-
cates of these practices claim that they are the response to the unprece-
dented threats to the safety. First and foremost, these practises are based 
on treating the opponents as “unlawful combatants” (these are the par-
ticipants of military actions, to whom neither the law of armed conflict 
nor the criminal law is applied); abductions as well as long-standing 
detention of people accused of terrorist activity with no right to defence 
or a court trial; extortion of testimonies through tortures or controversial 
interrogation techniques; the phenomenon of progressing privatisation 
of military services; finally, it is a so called targeted killings, applied to 
those suspected of terrorist actions.
The purpose of this article is the analysis of both legal and ethical 
acceptability of applying the targeted killing policy. In the field of law 
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the basic dispute on the understanding practices of this kind looks as fol-
lows: should they be understood as an extrajudicial execution, or as one 
of the ways of conducting a war (Kretzmer 2005)? When it comes to the 
former option, the targeted killing policy should be understood (and at 
the same time justified) in a way analogical to very rare cases, in which 
the internal law allows killing somebody without a trial; concerning the 
latter option - in a way analogical to the cases of killing fighting oppo-
nents, acceptable in the law of armed conflict. In turn, the dispute on the 
justification of the acceptability of the targeted killing policy looks as 
follows: should this policy be understood in the categories of the dispen-
sation of justice, or as a self-defence action. As I will prove in this text, 
the theoretical misunderstandings concerning the legal and ethical jus-
tification of the targeted killing policy are often caused by utterances of 
the politicians themselves, who, while seeking the justification for their 
actions, refer to mutually contradictory legal and ethical paradigms.
Analyses conducted in this text will be based on the main hy-
pothesis of the research project I currently conduct, which assumes that 
the norms regulating the acceptability and ways of carrying out armed 
conflicts should be consistent with moral intuitions concerning the use 
of violence, when it comes to individual cases. Therefore I claim that 
the effective justification of the legal acceptability of the targeted killing 
policy should be close to the justification of the acceptability of killing in 
the armed conflicts. The ethical justification should refer to the necessity 
of self-defence actions of a given community. 
The main problem I would like to emphasise is that when it 
comes to the targeted killing policy killing is very often the effect of pre-
ventive actions, whereas the typical justification of self-defence refers to 
the necessity of defence from the existing and unexpected threat. The 
practical implication of the argumentation presented in this article looks 
as follows: while it could help in legal and ethical justification of many 
cases of using the targeted killing policy, it could not be applied in the 
case of one of the most spectacular actions, which was the targeting and 
killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, which, as one can understand, 
was supposed to deliver justice for the terrorist attacks from the 11th of 
September 2001.
2. Targeted killing and the war against terrorism
Targeted killing of selected people has probably always been an 
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element of armed conflicts and various wars between states: the lead-
ers of other states were secretly killed, as well as people who worked 
on new types of weapon, and whose disappearance caused civil unrest, 
etc. However, in most cases the states or groups using this solution did 
not speak about it openly, but most often denied any connections with 
this or that assassination. The new aspect that appeared in the current 
targeted killing policy is the fact that in the several recent years it was 
recognized as an official tactics of conducting military action and anti-
terrorism action in two important democratic countries: Israel and the 
USA. 
Israel has officially applied the targeted killing policy since 2000, 
when Hussein Abayat was killed this way in the West Bank. Obviously, 
it is highly probable that when it comes to Israel, such a proceeding is 
nothing new, but undoubtedly the public admission of using this policy 
was something new. Other much publicised assassinations were those 
of Hammas leaders: Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, who were 
targeted and killed by the Israeli forces in 2004. It is estimated that in 
the period between November 2000 and October 2012, the Israeli forces 
have killed 437 people as a result of the targeted killing policy, mostly 
in the Gaza Strip of whom only 261 people were killed “according to the 
plan” and others were civilian casualties (B’Tselem 2013).
Similar policy of fighting new threats to public security has re-
cently been adopted by the United States of America. In November 2002 
six people were killed in Yemen by a rocket launched by a drone. One 
of the victims was Qaed Salim Sinan al Hareth, bin Laden’s bodyguard, 
who was supposed to be co-responsible for the attack on the American 
ship Cole in 2000, in which 17 American soldiers died. One of the most 
recent examples of how severe legal or moral problems can be caused by 
the targeted killing policy is a relatively late (September 2011) killing of 
Anwar al-Awlaki by a rocket launched from an American drone. He was 
a citizen of the USA, who had lived in Yemen for a couple of years, from 
where he called for conducting the holy war with the West. The permis-
sion for launching the rocket was given by the USA secretary of defence. 
The problem is that - as the critics of this decision argued - American 
citizens must not be killed without a trial. In turn, the advocates of the 
decision made by president Barrack Obama’s administration presented 
two ways of argumentation. First of all, they claimed that, according to 
the law of armed conflict, in war situations one can be killed without a 
trial, if they fight on the opposite site, even if they are a citizen of a given 
country; it is also allowed to execute traitors captured during military 
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action in an enemy’s army. Second, they argued that al-Awlaki’s assas-
sination is analogical to some actions in the period of peace, e.g. neces-
sary defence that allows police officers or soldiers to kill a given person 
without a trial, if their actions are a direct threat for other people’s lives. 
In this case one can perfectly see one of the main theoretical problems 
concerning the justification of the targeted killing policy: if it should be 
understood in the category of the law of armed conflict or in the cat-
egory of local law. 
The significance of this problem is also proved by the fact that 
at the time of Barrack Obama’s presidency the targeted killing policy 
became one of the main methods of fighting terrorism. At the time of 
Obama’s rule, American administration issued a permission to con-
duct many more “target and kill” operations than during the two terms 
of George W. Bush. According to one of the reports prepared on the 
basis of the data which appeared in reliable media (both Western and 
Middle-Eastern), between 2004 and 2013 the USA conducted 422 attacks 
in Pakistan’s and Yemen’s territory (including 49 at the time of George 
W. Bush’s presidency), killing from 2426 to 3969 people (New America 
Foundation 2013; The Bureau Of Investigative Journalism 2013).
The targeted killing policy is commonly recognised as an ele-
ment of anti-terrorist actions. A model example, to which many authors 
investigating this problem refer, looks as follows (Blum, Heymann 
2010): imagine that American Intelligence Services obtained reliable 
information about people preparing a terrorist attack against the USA. 
However, potential terrorists are on the territory of a state, which is not 
able to enforce the law itself. Obviously, American administration can 
formally ask the authorities of this state for capturing potential terrorists 
and judge them on the basis of existing regulations and international 
obligations of this state. The problem is that the state, where the terror-
ists are active is weak, the authorities do not control the whole territory 
effectively or simply refuse to cooperate in this matter - in spite of the 
obvious international provisions concerning this issue. In such a case 
- as the supporters of such policy claim - the only effective prevention 
against the planned terrorist attack is targeting a potential terrorist or 
their group and  striking in an appropriate moment, e.g. by a drone.
However, some authors underline that limiting the targeted kill-
ing policy to an anti-terrorist practices is a mistake (Statman 2012). Even 
if Israel or the USA call every attack on their citizens, territory or prop-
erty conducted by a group of fighters a “terrorist attack”, it is important 
to differentiate attacking civilian targets (e.g. the WTC attack from the 
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11th of September 2001) from attacking military targets (e.g. the suicidal 
attack from the 12th of October, 2000 on American guided missile de-
stroyer USS Cole stationing in Aden, Yemen). According to many popu-
lar definitions of terrorism, an attack on military target is not counted 
as a terrorist attack (Coady 1985, cf Held 1991). What is more, omitting 
complicated definitional questions concerning the understanding of ter-
rorism, one can imagine using the targeted killing policy during the tra-
ditionally understood armed conflicts (e.g. aimed at scientists working 
on new types of weapon). 
Therefore it seems that for the effective justification of targeted 
killing policy - either ethical or legal - there is no difference if its targets 
are terrorists (also those potential) or other categories of people. There-
fore in this text I will make an assumption that the criteria allowing for 
justification of killing are the same, no matter the formal classification of 
the victims, and in this way I will question if there are two different sys-
tems regulating the ethical acceptability of killing, depending on wheth-
er a given conflict is armed or not (McMahan 2004, Żuradzki 2010a). The 
criteria allowing for justification of killing are the following: an attack 
(also a potential one) of the second side has to be unjustified; that killing 
of a future perpetrator is the only way to stop the attack; that such a kill-
ing is proportional to the evil intended by the future perpetrators of the 
attack etc. Some investigators of international relations or the ethics of 
war would postulate a requirement that the perpetrator has to be mor-
ally responsible for the attack planed by them or a group they belong to 
(so they would not be only an instrument in somebody’s hands). There-
fore, if the targeted killing policy has to be ethically justified, it would be 
so due to fulfilling of some particular criteria, common for all acceptable 
forms of killing, and not because terrorist activity (also a potential one) 
is somehow distinguished and gives special privileges to a state that 
tries to fight it. Therefore the basic rule of the justification of the targeted 
killing policy has to be that the individuals against whom these methods 
can be applied, fight in a way that makes this policy the only effective 
way of fighting, and at the same time killing these individuals is accept-
able in the light of the widespread moral intuitions concerning general 
situations, when killing is allowed at all.
It should also be explained why in this text I write both about 
legal and ethical justification. By a legal justification I understand such 
a justification that tries to use the currently existing legal institutions 
and regulations to justify legality of this policy. Ethical justification 
is understood as such a justification that uses theories or doctrines in 
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broadly understood normative ethics to justify the fact that at least some 
cases of targeted killing are morally acceptable. When it comes to the 
targeted killing policy, the ethical and legal matters are closely bound 
to each other. Firstly, the authors who criticise targeted killing policy 
usually perceive it as both ethically and legally unacceptable, whereas 
those who defend it do it both in terms of ethics and law. Secondly, 
law - including international law - has its roots in various theories and 
doctrines of normative ethics. In particular, it refers to human rights and 
International humanitarian law. Thirdly, illegality of given practices (in 
particular when it comes to the law of armed conflict) can prove their 
unethicalness (although it does not work the other way around: many 
unethical practices are legally acceptable due to various reasons). Of 
course, it is worth noting that severe differences between legal and ethi-
cal normative evaluation of a given situation can exist: law (internation-
al law in particular) takes into consideration consequences of a given 
norm, therefore many fixed ethical norms are not codified in legal codes. 
3.  Extrajudicial execution or the law of armed conflict
In this chapter I will present the main theoretical problem con-
nected with justification of the targeted killing policy. Although in Israel 
this policy had been publicly acknowledged even before the 11th of Sep-
tember 2001, in the USA the application of this policy is in close relation 
to the so called “war on terrorism”. In his Address to Congress from the 
20th of September 2011, President George W. Bush said: 
We will direct every resource at our command - every means of 
diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law en-
forcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon 
of war - to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror 
network [...]. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one 
against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no 
refuge or no rest.  And we will pursue nations that provide aid or 
safe haven to terrorism.  Every nation, in every region, now has a 
decision to make.  Either you are with us, or you are with the ter-
rorists.  From this day forward, any nation that continues to har-
bour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as 
a hostile regime (quotation from Ratner 2010, 251).
In this speech one may found the sources of the present theoreti-
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cal problems connected with understanding the nature of and justifying 
the targeted killing policy. From this President Bush’s utterance one can 
draw a conclusion that the USA responses to the attacks on WTC will 
have various shapes: he speaks both of diplomatic and intelligence ser-
vice’s measures, as well as law enforcement (which suggests non-mili-
tary actions) and military measures (which suggests an armed conflict). 
On one hand, a response to terrorist attacks through law enforcement, 
means treating a terrorist act as a criminal - according to both the law 
of the country on which territory a given act was committed, and inter-
national criminal law. In such a case, the actions should be limited to 
police methods, both the preventive ones and those aiming at punishing 
the perpetrators, as well as different methods characteristic for criminal 
proceedings; extradition, cooperation with intelligence services, cooper-
ation at formulating indictment, etc. On the other hand, terrorist attacks 
are sometimes understood as a part of an armed conflict or its beginning 
– it is visible in the fragment of President Bush’s speech, in which he 
threatens the states that give shelter to terrorists. Such an understand-
ing does not mean law enforcement, but a regular armed conflict, dur-
ing which one is allowed to kill the opponents without warnings or any 
court sentence.
However, it is worth noticing that some aspects of the September 
11 attacks were nothing new, when it comes to using the whole spec-
trum of measures to fight terrorism. Both common criminal measures 
and military methods have been already used in fighting terrorism. 
What is more, the type of a response - as one could assume - did not 
depend on the scale of attack. For example, after very bloody attacks of 
1988 (Lockerbie - 270 victims, mostly the USA citizens) and 1989 (UTA 
772 flight, 171 victims, mostly citizens of France), governments of the 
USA, the United Kingdom and France appealed to Libya for an extradi-
tion of the terrorists, who were finally extradited after 10 years. Then 
they were sentenced in regular criminal trials. Also the investigation af-
ter the first attack on WTC in 1993 was conducted in accordance with 
regular criminal procedure. However, sometimes the United States of 
America, as well as other countries (e.g. Israel) assumed that a terrorist 
attack (or its threat only) is enough a basis for acting as if they were at-
tacked by foreign countries, which means referring to military methods 
and not measures of enforcing criminal law. It happened, for example, 
in 1986, when the USA bombarded Libya in retaliation for the attack on 
a Berlin club, popular among American soldiers, in which two USA sol-
diers died (there were three victims altogether). Similar methods were 
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used in 1993, when the USA bombarded Iraq in retaliation for the plan 
of George H.W. Bush’s assassination made by Hussein, or in 1998, when 
Sudan was bombarded in retaliation for the attacks on American embas-
sies in Africa. 
In this part of my article I will compare two paradigms (Ratner 
2010). I will begin with understanding terrorist activity as a crime, which 
is fought on the basis of international norms connected with respecting 
human rights. According to United Nations Charter, states are not al-
lowed to make any operations on the territory of another state without 
a permission of this state. What is more, no state is obliged to issue such 
a permission, it is also not obliged to agree on cooperation with other 
countries concerning extradition of people suspected of criminal activ-
ity. In fact, however, most of countries signed various agreements or 
treaties concerning extradition, and the United Nations Security Coun-
cil’s resolution adopted after the 11th of September 2001 instructs the 
states to extradite people suspected of terrorist activity. According to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, states must 
not kill its citizens without a court sentence, apart from some rare excep-
tions (I will investigate them below). This very Covenant includes an 
obligation of conducting a trial for detainees. There is also a customary 
rule that states are responsible for human rights violation by non-state 
parties on their territory, it does not, however, mean that other countries 
have right to invade territory of a given state. 
In turn, the second paradigm which refers to terrorism as a threat 
fought by methods characteristic for armed conflicts says that states are 
allowed to conduct military operations only as a self-defence after an 
attack of an enemy or right before it. They can also conduct such actions 
with permission of the United Nations Security Council (e.g. humani-
tarian interventions). Referring to the targeted killing policy, the most 
problematic is the obscurity of the international law rules concerning 
defence from aggressors who are not states, but, for instance, terrorist 
groups. Another problematic issue is the acceptability of attacking in 
retaliation against a state, from whose territory the attack came. What is 
not controversial is the fact that in military operations states are allowed 
to kill the opponent’s fighters with no warning. The fighter themselves 
should differ from civilians, who must not be a target of killing, but 
it is allowed to conduct military operations, which are assumed to be 
the reason of civilian deaths. However, damages and death of civilians 
should not be disproportionate to the military benefits expected from 
the conduct of a given military operation. Those fighting at the oppo-
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site side, after being captured cannot be judged or executed only for the 
reason that they were fighting. They can be judged only when they are 
accused of committing a war crime. 
The following question is obviously arising: which of these 
paradigms should be valid in case of the targeted killing policy evalua-
tion? At first glance it seems that if the USA does not conduct an armed 
conflict with another state currently, the paradigm referring to human 
rights is the proper one. However, this paradigm would certainly not 
be the basis for justifying the targeted killing policy. An example may 
be the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, in which the USA is a party. Article 2 of this Convention 
says that nobody can be killed, except from the cases of court sentences 
executions. It also says that it is allowed to kill someone in three excep-
tional situations: 1) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
2) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained; 3) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling 
a riot or insurrection. Theoretically, only point 1 could be possibly used 
as a justification for the targeted killing policy, however it is commonly 
interpreted as a defence from an immediate threat, and not targeting 
and killing someone long before the attack he is planning. 
Therefore the USA itself called the anti-terrorist actions after the 
11th of September 2001 a “war on terrorism”, and this way qualified it 
as an armed conflict, during which it is allowed to kill those fighting on 
the opposite side without a permission or a sentence (even if at a given 
moment they do not conduct military operations). Basically, during an 
armed conflict it is allowed to attack only fighters, but also civilians lose 
their immunity when they actively participate in military operations. 
American administration deliberately did not specify if the war with ter-
rorism is an international conflict or not, in order to avoid the obligation 
of applying some rules of ius in bello. It was decided that, on one hand, 
a so called “war with terrorism” is not an internal conflict, since it is not 
limited to the borders of one country. On the other hand, it is not inter-
national, since it is not waged between any particular states. As a result, 
the USA assumed that there is a legal gap and the regulations of Geneva 
Conventions and other regulations of international law concerning e.g. 
the way of treating war prisoners or other people, which are valid in 
time of either international or internal conflicts, are not applied during 
the so called “war on terrorism”. This way a category of people was es-
tablished, called by the USA administration as “unlawful combatants”. 
According to the rules applied by American authorities, those people 
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have neither a status of fighters (so they are not treated as war prison-
ers), nor the status of civilians. As a result, it was assumed that they 
are subject to criminal responsibility for the military operations they 
conduct (in a normal situation the enemy’s soldiers cannot be judged 
for their participation in fight only, as long as they did not commit any 
war crimes). They are also not restricted by the limits of detention time 
which are applied to the civilians. 
Apparently, the armed conflict paradigm is much more appro-
priate when it comes to the justification of the targeted killing policy. 
However, several problems exist. The most important of them is the risk 
of mistake: I quoted statistics saying that a considerable number of the 
targeted killing victims are civilian casualties that happened to be next 
to the actual targets. Somebody might assume that this policy does not 
meet the requirements of proportionality, which is included in ius in 
bello regulations, and according to which civilians can be casualties of 
an attack on a military target, but the sufferings inflicted on the civilians 
have to be proportional to the scale of the military target attacked in a 
given operation. However, this accusation would not be characteristic 
for the targeted killing policy - in many contemporary armed conflicts 
the casualties comprise a disproportionately big percentage of all vic-
tims (Żuradzki 2010b). 
4. Retribution or self-defence
After targeting and killing of Osama bin Laden by the American 
Special Forces on the Pakistan’s territory, American president barrack 
Obama said that “justice took its course”. Similarly, at the first anniver-
sary of bin Laden’s assassination Obama said that his country managed 
to “bring justice to a man who killed over 3 thousand citizens”. Similar 
conclusions appear also in scientific articles (David 2003). These state-
ments are surprising, since they mean that a typical example of imple-
mentation of targeted killing policy, which was bin Laden’s killing, was 
an act of justice understood in terms of retribution, or as a retaliation for 
the harm done to a give community. One can conclude from American 
president’s speech that in this case he was the judge himself and the ex-
ecutors of the “sentence” were American soldiers. In this part of my ar-
ticle I will try to prove that the targeted killing policy – if it is possible at 
all to justify it in the field of ethical theories - it would rather be accom-
plished through a reference to self-defence and not delivering justice.
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Firstly, one has to be a death penalty supporter in order to claim 
that sometimes “delivering justice” requires killing a man. In contem-
porary times it is quite controversial, since most of Western countries 
abolished death penalty. This means that delivery of justice - no matter 
the scale of the crime - never requires the killing of the perpetrator. Of 
course, one can argue that even in these countries, in which death pen-
alty was abolished (e.g. Poland), the possibility of its reintroduction is 
not completely excluded in special cases, e.g. when it comes to armed 
conflicts - and it is analogical to most cases, of the targeted killing policy 
application. 
Secondly, even if one would agree that delivering justice some-
times requires killing, after targeting the perpetrator should rather be 
brought into court than killed. Making the decision of bin Laden’s kill-
ing Obama obviously infringed on the separation of powers character-
istic for democratic systems: executive power should not pass sentences 
and then execute them. In all democratic systems it is widely accepted 
that it is the independent judiciary power, which can more objectively 
investigate the guilt of a suspect and adjust the sentence to it. At this 
point a problem connected with this issue is visible: the targeted killing 
policy - understood as delivery of justice - would assume only one type 
of a “punishment”, which is killing, while passing sentences in normal 
conditions always adjusts the punishment’s level to a defendant’s guilt. 
Thirdly, the targeted killing policy is connected with a severe 
risk for outsiders. The data quoted below suggest that, e.g., in case of 
Israel, only circa 60 percent of “target and kill” actions’ victims are the 
people, who were supposed to be killed - the remaining 40 percent are 
random witnesses, accompanying persons, sometimes family, including 
children. When it comes to justice delivery, it is not widely accepted to 
allow for such high human costs. Obviously, the work of the administra-
tion of justice – like every other institution – is burdened with mistakes, 
but certainly in no democratic country the percentage of mistakes made 
when delivering justice is as high as in case of the currently applied 
targeted killing policy. It is even more outrageous, since in this case the 
mistakes are killing casualties who happened to be close to a victim at a 
given time. There is also a different kind of risk connected with the tar-
geted killing policy: capital punishment opponents claim that the fact of 
the system of justice’s fallibility is an argument against applying death 
penalty, which is irreversible. Similar arguments can be used against the 
targeted killing policy. 
Finally, justification of the targeted killing policy which refers to 
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retributive justice would concern only those people, who have already 
committed an act of terror. Whereas in bin Laden’s case such justifica-
tion would work, it could not be used to defend many (maybe even most 
of) cases of using this policy, in which one kills people who only plan a 
terrorist attack or call for its (e.g. Anwar al-Awlaki). 
These are the reasons why a better justification of the targeted 
killing policy should be found. The basic question that should be an-
swered at this point sounds: why is killing allowed in some circumstanc-
es? Various doctrines and ethical theories agree that there are two main 
ways of justifying the acceptability of taking one’s life (McMahan 2012).
Above all, someone can be responsible for threatening other peo-
ple or just hurting them. If an armed aggressor tells us that they will kill 
us and there are reasons to believe them that this threat will come true, 
practically all ethical systems allow us – if only we are able to do it and 
there is no other way of stopping the aggressor – to kill them in self-
defence. In such a case outsiders or we ourselves would be allowed to do 
it – to defend other people. Some people believe that such an aggressor 
suspends their right to life or their right no to be killed. 
The second way of justification is a bit more controversial. For 
in this case a given person would not suspend their right to life, or the 
right to not be killed, but killing them is necessary for certain reasons. 
One can understand it in two different ways. 
From the agent-neutral perspective: in this case killing someone 
could be justified by the fact that no action would cause a big tragedy 
- much bigger than killing a given individual. It is worth noting that, 
although it can be associated with a conventionalist attitude (which is 
a normative ethics view saying that a moral value of a deed depends 
on the value of its expected or actual consequences), it does not have to 
be always this way. Even some people assuming non-conventionalist 
positions would say that some choices happen to be so tragic that one 
person’s sacrifice is a “lesser evil” than a sacrifice of very many people. 
What is more, the necessity of killing can be agent-relative. In this 
case a subjective perspective of a given agent would be taken into con-
sideration, from whose point of view the situation would be evaluated. 
Let us provide an example of it: some people claim that when defend-
ing the members of one’s family, the one is allowed to do the aggres-
sor more harm than the aggressor would do the potential victim. Many 
normative systems, in example, would allow a parent to kill an innocent 
person in order to avoid their child’s permanent injury. The parent has 
special relations with their child and a given situation is morally evalu-
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ated from the perspective of a worried parent and not a neutral decision-
maker whose main task is to minimalise suffering in a given population. 
However, it could not be justified from the agent-neutral perspective: 
according to this perspective, since even permanent injury is not as bad 
as death, it is not allowed to kill an innocent man only to save somebody 
from injury (as long as the person to be killed is not responsible for the 
child’s injury).
Sometimes the supporters of the traditional ethics of war use this 
second way to justify the acceptability of killing in armed conflicts. What 
they claim is that very often private soldiers are not responsible for the 
fact that they caused a threat and this way they do not suspend their 
right to life. The most obvious example would be as follows: the Pol-
ish soldiers in September 1939 did not suspend their right to life, they 
did nothing that would suspend this right. However, in the light of the 
still valid regulations of the armed conflict law German soldiers were 
allowed to kill them - as long as they conducted military operations in 
accordance with the law (they did not murder civilians, did not use cer-
tain types of weapon, etc.). This is what one of the main assumptions of 
the traditional just war doctrine is based on - the moral equality of the 
fighters. Michael Waltzer writes in his book Just and Unjust Wars: “The 
two sorts of judgement (which are ius in bello and ius ad bellum - TŻ) are 
logically independent. It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought 
unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the 
rules” (Walzer 2006: 21). It means that all the soldiers who participate in 
the conflict, no matter if they fight for the just cause or not, can be killed 
by the opponents, no matter if they are anyhow morally responsible for 
the conflict’s outbreak. 
This basic assumption of the traditional just war doctrine is in-
creasingly questioned by philosophers dealing with the ethics of war 
(McMahan 2009). Interestingly, as I have already mentioned, it was also 
questioned by the American administration, which on one hand says 
that they fight a just war with terrorism, but, on the other hand, does 
not agree that their opponents can fight it - therefore they are treated as 
“unlawful fighters”. This is why the American administration questions 
the assumption fundamental for the just war doctrine, saying that even 
unjust war can be fought in accordance with rules and the soldiers them-
selves cannot be morally and legally responsible for it. For this reason it 
seems that to justify the targeted killing policy it is better to use the first 
of the types of justifying acceptability of killing, described in this part. 
It is a justification saying that it is allowed to kill only those, who are 
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causatively responsible for posing a threat for other people or just for 
planning of posing such a threat.
5. Summary 
In this article I presented the possibility of justifying the legal 
and ethical acceptability of applying the targeted killing policy. To this 
end I used a modified paradigm of an armed conflict. I decided that it is 
much better for justifying the policy discussed here than the sometimes 
quoted paradigm of law enforcement. I also outlined the possibility of 
modifying the now existing paradigm of an armed conflict in a way that 
it is allowed to kill only those people who are causally and morally re-
sponsible for posing a threat (e.g. political leaders responsible for the 
conflict) or for the intention to pose a threat (e.g. the leaders of a terrorist 
organisation who plan an attack). The modification proposed in this ar-
ticle would be important for evaluating the acceptability of the targeted 
killing policy: it would be allowed to conduct it only in extraordinary 
circumstances, in which it would be the only possible way to stop the 
severe threat for safety (e.g. planning a terrorist attack, armed conflict). 
However, this policy would not be justified by means of retributive jus-
tice, which means seeking a just retaliation for the previously committed 
deeds. 
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